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Abstract
During the transition from a moderately high level of in°ation to
an internationally accepted level, the target, the in°ation rate, the
nominal interest rate and the nominal equilibrium interest rate may
be di®erence stationary. Policy rules estimation, however, is usually
performed under stationarity assumptions. In this note we set up a
monetary rule useful for characterizing the behavior of a central bank
during this transition. As in previous research, estimation may be
carried out by GMM on a nonlinear equation. We illustrate these
results by characterizing the behavior of the Colombian Central Bank
during the period of full in°ation targeting, that is after 2000.
1 Introduction
We distinguish two types of monetary policy rules: those dependent on
particular models and loss functions and those robust to them. While de-
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pendent rules are useful for monetary policy implementation, robust rules
are powerful tools to characterize the behavior of the monetary authority
over a time span.
Rules that are dependent on particular transmission mechanism models
and loss functions are also known as Targeting Rules, TR. In a targeting
rule, the central bank minimizes its loss function conditional on the dynamic
behavior of a particular transmission mechanism models. When the system
of ¯rst order conditions is solved, the explicit form of the targeting rule
arises. The explicit form of a targeting rule is regarded as optimal if the
policy instrument responds to the whole set of observable variables contained
in the model at time t, and is deemed as simple if the policy variable is
constrained to respond only to a subset of these variables. The Taylor rule
for the federal funds rate and the McCallum rule for the monetary base are
examples of simple rules. See Rudebush and Svensson [18].
Moreover, since it is widely accepted that monetary policy a®ects the
in°ation rate only after a lag, monetary authorities tend to respond in ad-
vance to innovations that may drive the in°ation forecast away from its
target. By including this element into the rule, In°ation Forecast Based,
IFB, rules arise.
Robust monetary policy rules are simple IFB rules that are estimated
directly from observable data. Estimates are derived usually under the as-
sumption that the target, the nominal interest rate, the equilibrium nominal
interest rate and the in°ation rate are stationary.
However, during the transition from a moderately high level of in°ation
to a stable, internationally accepted level, the Central Bank commitment
with this goal implies that the in°ation rate, the targets, the nominal interest
rates and the equilibrium nominal interest rates are non-stationary. A highlyThe Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 3
credible and strongly committed Central Bank may set the targets along a
pre speci¯ed deterministic trend from ¼0 to ¼, and under the assumptions
that the policy is unbiased and in°ation expectations are rational, the target,
the nominal interest rate and nominal equilibrium interest rate are trend
stationary.
However, there are several reasons to explain how a Central Bank in-
duces a unit root behavior on the observed variables during the transition,
and these are related to unobserved parameters like credibility and price
persistence, as well as the need of a soft landing.
Following Clarida Gal¶ ³ and Gertler [4], in this note we set up a robust
monetary policy rule in order to characterize the behavior of a central bank
during the the transition to a stable in°ation level. As in previous research,
this rule is a stationary non linear equation that can be estimated by GMM
provided we are able to obtain the required instruments.
We illustrate these results by characterizing the behavior of the Colom-
bian central bank during the period of in°ation targeting, that is after 2000.
Our estimation results reveal that after 2000 the Colombian central bank
pursued a gentle stabilization program for in°ation, a stronger one for the
output gap, and a high degree of interest rate smoothing. These results are
consistent with the prevailing policy during the sample span. Combining
these evidence with that of previous works, our results suggest that the
policy rule is state contingent to the output gap, an important result for the
implementation of monetary policy models.
We organize the rest of this note as follows. In section 2 we set up the
monetary rule. In the third we summarize the Colombian empirical research
on policy rules. In the fourth we apply our results to the Colombian case,
and in the last we conclude.4 Juan Manuel Julio R.
2 Setting Up the Policy Rule
In this section we assume that the in°ation targeting Central Bank has a
long term goal of bringing the in°ation rate down from a moderately high
in°ation level, ¼0, to an internationally accepted level ¼ < ¼0.
2.1 Non Stationarity in the Observed Variables
A highly credible and strongly committed Central Bank may set the targets
along a pre speci¯ed deterministic trend from ¼0 to ¼. Under the assump-
tions that the policy is unbiased and in°ation expectations are rational, the
target, the nominal interest rate and the nominal equilibrium interest rate
are stationary around deterministic trends.
However, there are several reasons to explain how a Central Bank induces
a unit root behavior on the observed variables during the transition. These
reasons relate to the need of a soft landing or to unobserved parameters
like credibility and price persistence, which may induce the Central Bank to
establish learning schedule. For instance, a Central Bank that is not fully
credible but is concerned with the short term costs of its lack of credibility
may choose to establish a learning plan. Depending on the past results, the
Central Bank adjusts the future targets to balance the cost of reducing the
in°ation with the credibility gains. As a result, the future targets would be
endogenous to past policy results.
Evidence of Central Bank endogenous targeting behavior, for the case
of Colombia, may be observed in ¯gure 1 that displays the behavior of the
changes in the in°ation rate implied by the targets. In this ¯gure we can
distinguish four di®erent periods of time; The ¯rst three years are consistent
with a policy to establish credibility. Once the credibility has been estab-
lished, the next four years (until 1997) relate to a commitment to reduceThe Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 5
the in°ation about 5% a year. Following, there is a two year transition pe-
riod related to the strong economic slowdown of 1998. After 2000 there is a
period of time related to in°ation reductions between 0% and 2:5% a year,
which are consistent with a soft landing.
Except for the transition period, which is related to the strong economic
slowdown of 1998, the policy seems to be related to a commitment to step-
ping implied in°ation reductions. The policy steps are the result of both
credibility gains and the in°ation level attained the last period of time. In
other words, the targets clearly depend on the rate on in°ation observed in
the last period of time.
Without loss of generality, the following example illustrates the behavior
of the observed variables during one of the steps. If the monetary authority
commits to an exogenously determined in°ation reduction from the last
observed result,
¼¤
t+1 = ¼t + Dt+1 (1)
where ¼¤
t+1 is the core in°ation target for t + 1, ¼t is the observed core
in°ation rate at t, and Dt+1 is an exogenous stochastic process such that
Dt+1 =
½
D + Ãt+1 During the transition to ¼
Ãt+1 After stabilization
where Ãt+1 is an exogenous zero mean stationary process and D < 0 is the
time invariant yearly average in°ation reduction. During the transition to ¼
the target is ¼¤
t+1 = ¼t+D+Ãt+1, and D determines the ex ante disin°ation
speed.
By setting and endogenizing the targets on the core in°ation, our mon-
etary authority avoids the transmission of transitory innovations to the in-
°ation so that these innovations die out.
The commitment to an exogenously determined time invariant reduction6 Juan Manuel Julio R.
from the last observed result contained in equation 1 is weaker than ¯xing
the targets along a pre speci¯ed linear trend and re°ects the fact that Cen-
tral Banks take into account the last observed results when ¯xing the new
targets.
A closer look to equation 1 reveals that the integration properties of
both, the target and the core in°ation rate, are by de¯nition the same. In
particular, ¼¤
t+1 ¡ ¼¤
t = ¼t ¡ ¼t¡1 during the transition.
Given that the cost of reducing the in°ation rate relates inversely to the
credibility of the monetary authority, and the credibility is related to policy
unbiasedness, we will assume that the monetary policy is unbiased, that is
¼t+njt ¡ ¼¤
t+n is a zero mean stationary process.
We will also assume that expectations are rational, which means that
¼t+njt ¡ ¼t+n is a zero mean stationary process. Although the rationality
assumption has been challenged in the empirical literature, it is standard in
many theoretical models1.
Combining these two assumptions with equation 1, we obtain that the
in°ation rate is a di®erence stationary process. In our notation, ¼t+njt =
Et[¼t+n], and ¼¤
t+n denotes the in°ation target.
The following assumptions are standard in the literature and do not
require further discussion. Under the assumption that the real rate
rt = it ¡ ¼t+njt (2)
is a stationary process, the nominal interest rate it is also a unit root process
during the transition to ¼, and a co-integration relationship between the
in°ation rate and the nominal interest rate holds 8t.
1Dropping the rationality assumption would require the adoption of a learning model
leading to a non robust rule.The Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 7
We will also asume that the deviations from the time varying equilibrium
nominal interest rates are stationary,
it ¡ it » I(0) (3)
which implies that it is also a unit root process. Furthermore, we assume
that the long run real interest rate equilibrium, r, is time invariant.
From this example we conclude that under a (reasonable) particular
kind of commitment in which the Central Bank sets the future in°ation
targets based on the last in°ation result, the targets, the in°ation rate, the
nominal interest rate and the nominal equilibrium interest rate are di®erence
stationary.
2.2 Setting Up The Policy Rule
In this section we assume that the targets are di®erence stationary but do not
assume a particular rule to ¯x them. We will also assume, as in the previous
subsection, policy unbiasedness and rational expectations. As a result, the
observed variables will have the integration orders described above, and the
co integration relations between them still hold.
We start from the monetary rule equation (2.1) in Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and
Gertler [4], which determines the target nominal rate as follows,
i¤






where ® is \the desired nominal rate when both in°ation and output are at
their target levels".
We depart from this speci¯cation by requiring ® to be the time varying
equilibrium nominal rate, it. Thus, our monetary authority sets the interest
rate targets according to
i¤





+ °ztjt (5)8 Juan Manuel Julio R.
where i¤
t is the short term nominal interest rate target and ztjt = Et[yt ¡y¤
t]
is the expected output gap.
Under the assumptions made in this section, equation 5 may be viewed
as the monetary authority setting targets on a stationary variable, the de-
viation of the nominal interest rate from the time varying equilibrium rate,
i¤
t¡it, as a function of two stationary variables, the deviation of the expected
in°ation rate from the target, ¼t+njt ¡ ¼¤
t+n, and the output gap, ztjt.
However, under our assumptions, if ® is time invariant, equation 4 relates
the left hand side non stationary variable to the stationary term in the right
hand side.
2.3 The Implied Real Rate Rule
Under the further assumption that the nominal interest rate equilibrium is
given by
it = r + ¼¤
t+n (6)
8n ¸ 1, and combining equations 2, 5 and 6 we obtain the real interest rate
rule
r¤






The signs of the parameter values in this equation provide important
insights about the monetary authority behavior. If ¯ > 1, the response of
the target real rate to a deviation of the expected in°ation from its target
is positive, which is consistent with a slowdown in economic activity and
in°ation. On the other hand, if ¯ < 1, the target real interest rate responds
in the opposite way creating a destabilizing environment. The same analysis
applies to the case of °. See Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler [4].
Again, equation 7 di®ers from the implied real rule in Clarida, Gal¶ ³ andThe Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 9
Gertler [4],
r¤






because of the stationarity assumption on ® = ® ¡ ¼¤
t+n.
2.4 Interest Rate Smoothing
Central banks tend to avoid the immediate nominal interest rate adjustments
suggested by a rule like 5, so they tend to smooth out monetary surprises.
In this section we assume that only the nominal interest rate stationary
component is smoothed out according to the equation
it ¡ it = (1 ¡ ½)(i¤
t ¡ it) + ½(it¡1 ¡ it¡1) + ºt (9)
where ºt is a stationary zero mean stationary process, and 0 < ½ < 1
determines the degree of interest rate smoothing2.
By replacing equation 9 into 5, we obtain
it ¡ ¼t = (1 ¡ ½)[¯(¼t+njt ¡ ¼¤
t+n) + °ztjt] + ½(it¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1) + ºt (10)
Under the rational expectations assumption and provided that at time
t we have in°ation expectations and output gap measures, equation 10 is
a simple IFB rule consistent with rational expectations forecasts. Provided
that at time t we have measures of future in°ation expectations, equation
10 gives the ¯nal form of our monetary rule. Estimation may be carried out
by GMM provided that we are able to ¯nd a vector of instruments Ut such
that Et["tjUt] = 0.
2In this note we are interested in smoothing rules only. Level rules, ½ = 0 and di®erence
rules, ½ = 1 will not be discussed in this note.10 Juan Manuel Julio R.
3 The Colombian Case
3.1 Empirical Research on Policy Rules in Colombia
Table 1 summarizes the previous research on monetary policy rules in Colom-
bia. All empirical works, except for Bernal [2], focus on Targeting Rules,
TR, as they depend on speci¯ed loss functions which are minimized condi-
tional on a pre speci¯ed models of transmission mechanisms.
We distinguish two completely di®erent periods of time following the
1991=1992 constitutional reform that required the Colombian central bank
to set in°ation targets below the last observed result. The main di®erence
between the two periods of time is the choice of the policy instrument and
the exchange rate regime.
Although during the two periods the main target was in°ation, from
1991 to 1999 the policy instrument was the money growth and there was
an exchange rate band target. The second period of time, after 1999, is
characterized by the adoption of the overnight interbank lending rate, TIB,
as the policy instrument and a free exchange rate °oat. As a result, the
interbank overnight loan rate, the growth of the monetary aggregates and
the exchange rate devaluation rate show important behavioral di®erences
between the two periods of time.
3.1.1 Targeting Rules
Early attempts to obtain monetary policy rules in Colombia date back to
1999. See Julio and G¶ omez [12]. In this paper the authors propose an
elementary short run model for the Colombian monetary policy with an
unobserved output gap.
Since at that time the policy variable was the money growth, the policy
instrument was the monetary surprise. The authors ¯nd both the opti-The Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 11
mal targeting rule and the optimal McCallum type rule. These rules are
consistent with a non forward looking loss function which includes actual
deviations of the in°ation rate, output gap and the monetary surprise, which
implies some degree of policy smoothing. The authors ¯nd that in an early
stage of monetary targeting, the central bank pursued a gentle in°ation-
ary stabilization program, a more aggressive one on the output gap and no
policy smoothing.
Using an early version of the current MMT model, the central model for
forecasting and policy analysis used in the Colombian Central Bank, G¶ omez
and Julio [8] found the coe±cients of IFB rules of the form










by means of stochastic simulations.
The smoothing parameter ½ was set to zero because of the long history of
large changes in interest rates in Colombia, and ¯ was calibrated at 0:5, con-
sistent with a pure in°ation targeting stabilization program with no policy
smoothing.
Using a later forward looking version of the MMT model consisting of
seven equations, L¶ opez [13] studies the choice of a simple rule that is con-
sistent with in°ation targeting. Following Batini and Nelson [1], in order to
set up the targeting rules, the author uses as loss function the discounted
expected weighted deviation of present and future deviations of the in°ation
rate, output and the change of the interest rate from their targets.
By performing simulations on a grid of the posible coe±cients values of
three alternative rules, the author ¯nds the values that minimize the loss
function. See Black et al [3] and Drew and Hunt [6]. The author's main
conclusion match nicely previous results from the international literature.12 Juan Manuel Julio R.
IFB rules are optimal in comparison to Taylor rules. The optimal policy
horizon is between six to eight quarters, and the interest rate smoothing
coe±cient is zero. However, Taylor rules may achieve lower in°ation-output
variability than IFB rules at a cost of higher in°ation-instrument variability.
Later MMT model versions, MMT4, have used a rule of the form















where the long run mean interest rate is the 90 days certi¯cate of deposit
plus a constant spread, it = icd
t +°i, and the long run mean CDs rate equals
the long run mean real rate plus the expected in°ation, a result based on
L¶ opez [13]. These results constitute the benchmark for monetary policy
model implementation in Colombia. See Banco de la Rep¶ ublica [5].
More recently Perez [16] studied the convenience of having the interest
rate respond to either the total in°ation, the domestic in°ation or the exter-
nal in°ation in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Stochastic, DGES, model.
Although in this paper no loss function was minimized, the e±ciency fron-
tier was found by stochastic simulations on a parameter grid as described
above.
The author ¯nds that simple rules that respond to a rule consistent fore-
cast of the total in°ation are better than the ones based on the domestic
or imported in°ation rate. For an economy that is highly vulnerable to ex-
ternal shocks, with an important tradeable sector and perfect pass through,
the author ¯nds that the optimal response of the monetary authority is for-
mulated in terms of deviations from the total in°ation forecast rather than
to the tradeable or non tradeable components.The Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 13
3.1.2 Robust Rules
Bernal [2] studied alternative estimates of monetary policy rules in Colombia
for the 1990's period. The rule used in that paper comes from Clarida, Gal¶ ³
and Gertler [4]










where the error term ºt is an interest rate smoothing random error.
This monetary policy rule corresponds to an IFB smoothing instrument
rule consistent with rational expectation in°ation forecasts.
By assuming that the in°ation targets and the log run equilibrium in-
terest rates are constant, ¼¤
t = ¼¤ for all t , and rewriting the rule in terms
of realized variables, Bernal [2] gets a convenient form for estimation,
it = ½it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)® + (1 ¡ ½)f¯¼t+n + °ztg + "t
where ® = i¡¯¼¤; and the residual term, "t depends on ºt and the forecast
error.
The later form is convenient for estimating the monetary policy param-
eters provided the existence of suitable set of instruments, Ut, that satisfy
the population moment condition E ["t=Ut] = 0. Since rational expectations
were assumed, it is su±cient that Ut satisfy E [ºt=Ut] = 0.
The author ¯nds that b ¯ = 1:34, b ° = 0:19 and b ½ = 0:10, which support
the conclusion that Colombian monetary policy during the nineties is a \soft
hearted in°ation targeting regime", where there is a modest component of
pure stabilization in the rule, and the estimates indicate that the rule focus
seems to be only the in°ation rate. Moreover, interest rate smoothing is low,
as expected, because the policy instrument was at this time the growth of
a monetary aggregate, and the exchange rate regime was an exchange rate
band.14 Juan Manuel Julio R.
Under the assumption that the nominal interest rate and the in°ation
rate are both stationary or at most trend stationary, this form is suitable
for estimation by GMM. See footnote 3 of Bernal [2].
However, if the nominal interest rate and the in°ation rate are both dif-
ference stationary, GMM does not necessarily provide adequate estimates for
equation 3.1.2. In this case Johansen's [11] maximum likelihood, Phillips and
Hansen's [17] fully modi¯ed estimation, Park's [15] canonical cointegrating
regression, and Stock and Watson's [19] estimations are more appropriate.
See Hall [10] and Mtis [14].
3.2 Estimation Results
3.2.1 Data
The 1991=1992 Colombian constitutional reform required the central bank
to set in°ation targets not higher than the in°ation rate observed in the last
December and provided the board of governors independence to pursue its
objectives. Although a 1999 Colombian constitutional court ruling relieved
the bank from the requirement to set in°ation targets below the last observed
rate, the Colombian central bank is committed, and has been very successful
so far, in bringing the in°ation rate down to internationally accepted levels
in the long run.
Figure 2 shows the observed in°ation rate along with its point target.
Decreasing historical targets are consistent with a policy to reduce the in°a-
tion rate to internationally accepted levels, and historical observed in°ation
rates followed suit.
Following an escalade of attacks to the Colombian currency band, it was
abandoned in favor of a free °oating in September 1999. This move gave
priority to the in°ation target over any other target. Figure 3 shows theThe Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 15
evolution of the in°ation rate and the COP yearly devaluation rate (right
scale). As expected, the exchange rate devaluation is more volatile under
free °oating, showing a clear distinction between the two exchange rate
regimes.
However, only after the adoption of a central model for policy analysis
and forecasting in 2000, the Colombian central bank satis¯ed the whole set
of criteria to join the in°ation targeting club; (i) independence, (ii) explicit
in°ation targets, (iii) ability to understand the monetary policy transmission
mechanism and to reasonably forecast the in°ation rate and (iv) priority to
the in°ation target over any other target. See Gomez, Uribe and Vargas,
[9].
Figure 5 displays the evolution of the observed in°ation rate and the
overnight interbank rate. As expected, prior to the exchange rate band
collapse the interbank rate shows higher volatility. In spite of this, the
interbank and in°ation rates tend to move together in the long run. In the
short run the inverse relationship is clear during and after the exchange rate
band collapse.
Since it is widely known that the costs of reducing the in°ation rate
decrease, and can even be null, when the monetary authority is credible,
credibility becomes the most important asset for an in°ation targeting cen-
tral bank. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the targets, the observed in°ation
rate and the result of the expectations survey. Expectations are higher than
the observed in°ation rate all the time except for the December 2002 to
March 2004 period. However, the distance between the expected and ob-
served in°ation rate has reduced constantly, which may constitute evidence
of central bank credibility gains3.
3Although this expectations behavior seems to be inconsistent with the rational expec-16 Juan Manuel Julio R.
The full in°ation targeting regime in Colombia characterizes for the out-
put gap recovery following the strong slowdown of 1998=1999. Figure 6 dis-
plays the behavior of the output gap, the di®erence between the expected
and target in°ation rate, and the interbank overnight loan rate (right scale).
After reaching a bottom of ¡4:0% in 2002 the output gap recovered steadily
until 2006 when it was close to its natural target, zero. This economic slow-
down created enough disin°ation pressure to keep the in°ation rate aligned
with its target without the need of further nominal interest rate increases.
Taking advantage of this situation, the Colombian central bank cleverly
tuned in the interest rate level during the 2000 ¡ 2003 period in order to
push growth without compromising the in°ation target, so that only minor
interest rate corrections were required after.
Our data set consists of quarterly measures of the nominal interbank
overnight rate, the core CPI in°ation rate, the in°ation rate targets, the
historical in°ation expectations survey result and the output gap. The sam-
ple includes information from the start of the full in°ation targeting regime
in Colombia, the fourth quarter of 2000, to the second quarter of 2006.
3.2.2 Results
The following equation contains the estimation results for the baseline equa-
tion 10, using as instruments 6 lags of the interest-in°ation di®erential,
it ¡¼t, 4 lags of the expected-target di®erential, ¼t+njt ¡¼¤
t+n, and 2 lags of
the output gap.
it ¡ ¼t = (1-0.61)f 1.21 (¼t+njt ¡ ¼¤
t+n)+ 0.55 ztg+ 0.61 (it¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1) + ´t
Std. Error 0.30 0.18 0.10
P-Value 0.00 0.01 0.0
tations assumption, the period of time is too short for expectation errors to cancel out.
This backward-looking behavior in expectations may be observed even if expectations are
rational. See for instance Erceg and Levin [7].The Monetary Policy Rule During The Transition 17
Parameter estimates are highly signi¯cant and sensible both in signs and
magnitudes according to the policy that prevailed during the sample span.
The in°ation stabilization parameter estimate b ¯ = 1:21 and the output gap
stabilization parameter estimate b ° = 0:55 reveal that during this time, the
Colombian central bank pursued a gentle in°ation stabilization program and
a more aggressive one on the output gap. Moreover, the nominal interest rate
smoothing parameter estimate, b ½ = 0:61, reveals a high degree of Central
Bank aversion towards policy surprises, consistent with the observed data.
Finally, the over-identifying restrictions test J-statistic took the value, J =
0:22, which clearly does not reject the null. See Hall [10] and M¶ ati¶ as [14].
These results are not surprising given that during the sample span the
output gap had been recovering from a strong economic downturn, and only
near the end of the sample it is getting close to its natural target, zero.
In comparison with Bernal's [2] results, our estimates imply that after
2000 the central bank shifted its attention from in°ation to the gap and
increased the level of policy smoothing. These results are consistent with
time varying policy rules, an important fact for policy implementation.
4 Conclusions
During the transition from a moderately high in°ation level, ¼0, to an inter-
nationally accepted level of in°ation, ¼, the monetary authority tends to set
decreasing, that is time varying, in°ation targets. Under the assumptions
that the monetary policy is unbiased, in°ation expectations are rational and
the real rate is stationary, the in°ation rate, the nominal interest rate and
the equilibrium nominal interest rate are also non stationary, and may be
di®erence stationary.
Under the further assumption that only the stationary component of the18 Juan Manuel Julio R.
nominal interest rate is smoothed out, we obtain an alternative form of the
monetary rule equation adapted to the transition period. This monetary
rule resembles an ex-post real interest rate rule, a stationary equation.
Using a data set that covers the full in°ation targeting regime in Colom-
bia, a period characterized for the recovery from a strong economic down-
turn, the proposed monetary rule is estimated. Estimation results show that
during the sample span, the Colombian Central Bank pursued a gentle in-
°ation stabilization program, a more aggressive one on the output gap and
a high degree of interest rate smoothing. These results are consistent with
the prevailing policy at that time.
Combining these results with those of Bernal [2], our evidence suggests
time varying monetary rule parameters, a relevant issue for policy imple-
mentation.
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